With respect, discussions about what philosophy is plausibly get nowhere because there is no "where" in philosophy. As the old quip goes: theory without facts is philosophy; facts without theory are madness. When philosophers are better schooled in evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and thermodynamics of biochemical processes and systems, perhaps their disputes could be more productive of light and not just heat. At their best, philosophers could help clear up errors in thinking, and hopefully restrain their urges to construct elaborate systems. Perhaps just as " scientism" is intellectual abuse, so is "philosophism".
"When philosophers are better schooled in evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and thermodynamics of biochemical processes and systems, perhaps their disputes could be more productive of light and not just heat."
Another alternative, of course, would be for philosophers to limit themselves to the kind of questions to which evolutionary psychology, neuroscience and thermodynamics make no difference. But if one decides to do so - and thus consciously takes as one's aim precisely to go nowhere, or to go somewhere as little as possible - one will perhaps find that this too is extremely difficult. (Cf. "Trying to Go Nowhere: An Autobiographical Afterword" in the late D. Z. Phillips's 1999 book Philosophy's Cool Place.)
McDowell to Bob Brandom: "His representation of me fails to achieve even the status of a caricature - which would require a recognizable likeness";
Also McDowell in the same paper: "My thanks to Bob Brandom for many conversations and a joint seminar"
Maybe there's also a deeper point between McDowell's *method* and his writing style - the difficulty of being understood (re: Crispin Wright's famous complaint: something to the effect of 'McDowell is a strong swimmer, but his stroke is not to be imitated.')
Kieran, I like where your mind takes me. I doubt aporia is quantifiable, but I seem to live with a lot of it—a kind of persistent overwhelm, even though my life is good and unreasonably stable.
I get lost in the philosophical weeds quickly when talking about Mind and World, real and circular and definitions. Pretty soon we are into McDowellean thinkables and Fregean thoughts, and I’ll never post a comment. We seem we wonder how our thoughts have a grip on the world. Maybe McDowel is saying that grip is already built into our thoughts?
Your project of seeking "real definitions" reminds me of Professor Elijah Millgram’s view that the mind’s job is to run a defeasible inference engine under severe resource constraints, and philosophy’s job is engineering our intellectual tools for doing so.
Anyway, I better post this now. I hope to come back if I can find my way out of the weeds. Meanwhile I’ll bask in aporia.
With respect, discussions about what philosophy is plausibly get nowhere because there is no "where" in philosophy. As the old quip goes: theory without facts is philosophy; facts without theory are madness. When philosophers are better schooled in evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and thermodynamics of biochemical processes and systems, perhaps their disputes could be more productive of light and not just heat. At their best, philosophers could help clear up errors in thinking, and hopefully restrain their urges to construct elaborate systems. Perhaps just as " scientism" is intellectual abuse, so is "philosophism".
"When philosophers are better schooled in evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and thermodynamics of biochemical processes and systems, perhaps their disputes could be more productive of light and not just heat."
Another alternative, of course, would be for philosophers to limit themselves to the kind of questions to which evolutionary psychology, neuroscience and thermodynamics make no difference. But if one decides to do so - and thus consciously takes as one's aim precisely to go nowhere, or to go somewhere as little as possible - one will perhaps find that this too is extremely difficult. (Cf. "Trying to Go Nowhere: An Autobiographical Afterword" in the late D. Z. Phillips's 1999 book Philosophy's Cool Place.)
How is it possible that some philosophers feel "how possible?" questions are so compelling?
McDowell to Bob Brandom: "His representation of me fails to achieve even the status of a caricature - which would require a recognizable likeness";
Also McDowell in the same paper: "My thanks to Bob Brandom for many conversations and a joint seminar"
Maybe there's also a deeper point between McDowell's *method* and his writing style - the difficulty of being understood (re: Crispin Wright's famous complaint: something to the effect of 'McDowell is a strong swimmer, but his stroke is not to be imitated.')
Kieran, I like where your mind takes me. I doubt aporia is quantifiable, but I seem to live with a lot of it—a kind of persistent overwhelm, even though my life is good and unreasonably stable.
I get lost in the philosophical weeds quickly when talking about Mind and World, real and circular and definitions. Pretty soon we are into McDowellean thinkables and Fregean thoughts, and I’ll never post a comment. We seem we wonder how our thoughts have a grip on the world. Maybe McDowel is saying that grip is already built into our thoughts?
Your project of seeking "real definitions" reminds me of Professor Elijah Millgram’s view that the mind’s job is to run a defeasible inference engine under severe resource constraints, and philosophy’s job is engineering our intellectual tools for doing so.
Anyway, I better post this now. I hope to come back if I can find my way out of the weeds. Meanwhile I’ll bask in aporia.
Gary