The philosopher Neil Levy’s recent book about peer review is more than a book about peer review. Its first half is about bullshit, interpretive charity, and the hermeneutic circle. Levy tackles a critique of the journal system that turns not on overburdened editors and reviewers or predatory publishers but on
It appears both your comment and Neil Levy's book (which I haven't yet read) have a focus on philosophy work when discussing peer review. Beyond these higher level issues, I believe there are more clearer and more fundamental issues inherent in peer review. It's a volunteer work most of us do out of custom, and it comes with very little accountability due to the widely adopted anonymous peer review system.
You mention the protest against Derrida getting an honorary degree back in 1991. One of the philosophers involved in that was Hugh Mellor. There is an interview where Mellor says a bit more about Derrida, not completely dismissive, and also on the specific question of whether what he had written was notable. The more interesting question about Derrida is how far his ideas were similar to views held by Quine or Hilary Putnam. Putnam had some views about the impact of Jacques, in a chapter of "Renewing Philosophy". Jenny Teichman also had a sceptical view of Derrida, reprinted in her collection "Ethics And Reality".
I heard Mellor talking about his time in editorial jobs. He said that his impact on the journal Mind was to "get rid of the Popperian rubbish, or at least the more sycophantic rubbish". He also said that when he was involved with CUP he turned down "The Scientific Image" by Bas van Frassen as he thought it needed more work... and so it was published elsewhere, and acquired a little following. I got the impression he didn't think it was good even in the improved version.
He said that working as a referee/editor had a bad effect on his style, as his own papers became "armour-plated" to deal with every conceivable challenge.
Despite their different politics, Mellor was friendly with Roger Scruton. I think he enjoyed the lecture Scruton came to give, in which he said that Foucault's ideas were quite similar to those of Quine and Goodman except that "they had actual arguments for positions he adopted solely on rhetoric" something like that. The overall tone being that "continental thought" doesn't really have any different content, but its presentation plays to a diffferent audience. Note though that Scruton was rather a fan of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre (at least under his own interpretations), didn't like Ayer or what he thought were shallow Anglophone responses to them.
Since AI systems are supposed to be grown and calibrated against existing canonical examples of specific styles and genres, it's entirely appropriate they should write acceptable new examples. The real shocker would be if they wrote a new scientific treatise, full of experimental results that were never performed but prove to be true. That would be a new Borges story as well.
Levy's 'bullshit' diagnosis of rejection, at least as you describe it (disclaimer - I haven't read his book!), helps make sense of a trend I've noticed in my experience. I've had a much harder time getting my papers published when they are on foundational conceptual issues - that is, on how we should understand the nature of certain concepts used in philosophy (in my case, the concepts of moral obligation and obligation to individuals). In contrast, I've found it easier to get papers published when they advocate views within an established literature with an established set of concepts and terminology (in my case, the literature on promising). Perhaps that's just because the former papers are less good! But the impression I've gotten is that, in the conceptual debates, when a reviewer disagrees with my view about how concepts should be understood or what distinctions we should be making, they conclude not just that I am wrong, but that I am conceptually confused. They think I am talking nonsense, rather than disagreeing with them about how we should make sense of things.
However, I also think the bullshit diagnosis is incomplete, because another trend I dislike in philosophical peer review is reviewers deciding whether to accept a paper based simply on how many objections they can come up with to the argument. Your paper might make perfect sense to them, but if they can dream up enough counterexamples to your view, they decide it shouldn't be published. I think this focus on objectability (to the exclusion of e.g. originality, ambition, quality of writing) incentivizes conservative, unambitious papers, to the detriment of the field.
Hello Kieran,
It appears both your comment and Neil Levy's book (which I haven't yet read) have a focus on philosophy work when discussing peer review. Beyond these higher level issues, I believe there are more clearer and more fundamental issues inherent in peer review. It's a volunteer work most of us do out of custom, and it comes with very little accountability due to the widely adopted anonymous peer review system.
I have written about the issue as a part of broader issues in academic publishing. In case you're interested, you can take a look at here : https://mahmutruzi.substack.com/p/addressing-and-resolving-critical
Link for Open Access version of the book:
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/philosophy-bullshit-and-peer-review/F54B9C195549B08D69311EF385DF3D56
I entirely agree, the academic and professional philosophical world needs more charity and generosity.
But the world at large, and particularly the political world, is increasingly steeped in the stuff that needs calling out.
What's a philosopher to do?
Maybe spend a little more time attending to the larger world, and a little less to peers?
A little, at least?
You mention the protest against Derrida getting an honorary degree back in 1991. One of the philosophers involved in that was Hugh Mellor. There is an interview where Mellor says a bit more about Derrida, not completely dismissive, and also on the specific question of whether what he had written was notable. The more interesting question about Derrida is how far his ideas were similar to views held by Quine or Hilary Putnam. Putnam had some views about the impact of Jacques, in a chapter of "Renewing Philosophy". Jenny Teichman also had a sceptical view of Derrida, reprinted in her collection "Ethics And Reality".
I heard Mellor talking about his time in editorial jobs. He said that his impact on the journal Mind was to "get rid of the Popperian rubbish, or at least the more sycophantic rubbish". He also said that when he was involved with CUP he turned down "The Scientific Image" by Bas van Frassen as he thought it needed more work... and so it was published elsewhere, and acquired a little following. I got the impression he didn't think it was good even in the improved version.
He said that working as a referee/editor had a bad effect on his style, as his own papers became "armour-plated" to deal with every conceivable challenge.
Despite their different politics, Mellor was friendly with Roger Scruton. I think he enjoyed the lecture Scruton came to give, in which he said that Foucault's ideas were quite similar to those of Quine and Goodman except that "they had actual arguments for positions he adopted solely on rhetoric" something like that. The overall tone being that "continental thought" doesn't really have any different content, but its presentation plays to a diffferent audience. Note though that Scruton was rather a fan of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre (at least under his own interpretations), didn't like Ayer or what he thought were shallow Anglophone responses to them.
Since AI systems are supposed to be grown and calibrated against existing canonical examples of specific styles and genres, it's entirely appropriate they should write acceptable new examples. The real shocker would be if they wrote a new scientific treatise, full of experimental results that were never performed but prove to be true. That would be a new Borges story as well.
Levy's 'bullshit' diagnosis of rejection, at least as you describe it (disclaimer - I haven't read his book!), helps make sense of a trend I've noticed in my experience. I've had a much harder time getting my papers published when they are on foundational conceptual issues - that is, on how we should understand the nature of certain concepts used in philosophy (in my case, the concepts of moral obligation and obligation to individuals). In contrast, I've found it easier to get papers published when they advocate views within an established literature with an established set of concepts and terminology (in my case, the literature on promising). Perhaps that's just because the former papers are less good! But the impression I've gotten is that, in the conceptual debates, when a reviewer disagrees with my view about how concepts should be understood or what distinctions we should be making, they conclude not just that I am wrong, but that I am conceptually confused. They think I am talking nonsense, rather than disagreeing with them about how we should make sense of things.
However, I also think the bullshit diagnosis is incomplete, because another trend I dislike in philosophical peer review is reviewers deciding whether to accept a paper based simply on how many objections they can come up with to the argument. Your paper might make perfect sense to them, but if they can dream up enough counterexamples to your view, they decide it shouldn't be published. I think this focus on objectability (to the exclusion of e.g. originality, ambition, quality of writing) incentivizes conservative, unambitious papers, to the detriment of the field.