I’ll admit it: I am not a fan of Buddhism. I know this doesn’t sound good—like confessing to contempt for puppies or to harbouring doubts about human kindness. But it’s best to be plain-spoken. Reader, consider yourself warned.
What bothers me is a particular nexus of ideas: the “no-self” view in Buddhist metaphysics and its implications for ethical life. I’ve expressed my reservations more than once, in passing, first in Midlife, then in Life is Hard. But I was too dismissive. You can’t refute a tradition that goes back 2500 years in a couple of quick sentences. You need at least 71.
What makes my critique obnoxious is that, despite having read a fair few books about Buddhism, I am not an expert in the field. Instead, I rely on scholars like Donald S. Lopez, whose lectures on The Scientific Buddha are a source of seditious joy. Lopez studiously mocks contemporary claims to reconcile Buddhist philosophy with cutting-edge science, tracing their tendency back to Victorians like William Erskine and Eugene Burnouf. “If Buddhism was compatible with the science of the nineteenth century,” Lopez innocently asks, “how can it also be compatible with the [conflicting] science of the twenty-first?”
The Buddha of the sutras is decidedly supernatural, aware of everything past, present, and future, including the inner lives of others, able to live forever but deciding not to. Karma is the basic law of nature, governing a realm of immaterial conscious events. This is not the science of the nineteenth or the twenty-first century.
If Buddhism is not science, can it be reconciled with cutting-edge philosophy? Like Lopez, I am sceptical. The reconciliation faces a dilemma.
We could give an inflationary reading of the no-self view: a radical metaphysics on which first-person thought—“I think, therefore I am”—refers to nothing at all. The concept I purports to designate a substance given to introspection, the radical theorist holds: not a being of flesh and bone, but the bed in which the stream of consciousness flows. Yet argument, or meditation, shows that there is no such thing. In that sense, I do not exist.
If we interpret it on these lines, we can see why the no-self view has ethical upshots. Our obsessive self-concern cannot survive the revelation that there is no self—no I—to be concerned with. Mortality and loss are less traumatic. (At least that’s the idea; as I wrote in Life is Hard, it’s never been clear to me why the discovery of no-self is not itself traumatic, like being told that everyone you know, including you, is already dead.)
But the inflationary approach has problems. It isn’t obvious, on reflection, how it could subvert our attachment to other people. My inordinate self-interest may turn on the idea that “I” refers to something other than a living organism. My inordinate attachment to my wife and child does not.
Nor do I believe the metaphysical arguments work. They are related to arguments presented by Mark Johnston in Surviving Death, which trace back to Buddhism through Derek Parfit and David Hume. As I’ve argued elsewhere (in section II of this review), those arguments do not convince; and I have yet to see better ones. The concept I picks out a concrete human being.
Of course, I might be wrong: there could be stronger reasons for the no-self view. But that doesn’t affect the basic point. On the inflationary reading, the no-self view is a matter of wildly contentious metaphysics; and while it may have ethical implications, they are both alarming and uncertain.
Anecdotally, this is the point at which one’s interlocutor complains that one has set up a straw man. The no-self view is not the bald assertion that you don’t exist; it’s more subtle than that. To which I say: fair enough! But then we land on the other coast of the great dilemma.
On a deflationary reading, the metaphysics of no-self denies that we are indivisible or immaterial substances. Perhaps it adds, with Jay Garfield, that composite objects are no more than useful fictions, so that we are useful fictions, too. Or, with Robert Wright, it proclaims that “there is no one self, no conscious CEO, that runs the show.”
The problem is that it is mysterious why ardent self-concern or paralyzing fear of death, let alone attachment to others, have anything to do with being non-composite, or with the “CEO self.” So it is a mystery how these versions of the no-self view could bear on ethical life. In truth, they don’t—at least not in any way that lives up to the rhetoric of liberation.
How do contemporary Buddhists argue otherwise? I’ve criticized Garfield’s thinking in a book review. Wright’s reasoning strikes me as equally flawed. He argues, first, that the no-self view helps us transcend the selfish values thrust on us by natural selection. But this argument makes no sense: if self-interest is a product of natural selection, so is concern for others.
Second, Wright contends that self-concern is incoherent:
Consider the absurdity of the current situation: this planet is full of people operating on the premise that their interests trump the interests of pretty much everyone else on the planet—yet it can’t be the case that everybody is more important than everybody else.
Where to start with this? Maybe with the fact that nothing in it rests on the no-self view in any form. There’s been a bait-and-switch. Then with the fact that it’s philosophically confused. Wright’s argument has the authority of G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica behind it:
Egoism holds, therefore, that each man's happiness is the sole good—that a number of different things are each of them the only good thing there is—an absolute contradiction! No more complete and thorough refutation of any theory could be desired.
But whatever Moore’s stature, the fallacy here is now proverbial: refuting it is an exercise for undergraduates, a philosophical warm-up, like practicing scales. According to the egoist, I should pursue my own good and everyone else should do the same. But this means that they should each pursue their good, not—absurdly—mine! The claim is about relative, not absolute, importance. And it is perfectly coherent.
If the first horn of the dilemma is a radical metaphysics, unsupported by proof, whose ethical upshots are disturbing if obscure, the second horn is metaphysical banality void of ethical interest, combined with unrelated ethical arguments that don’t work.
The last resort is to insist, as a matter of brute psychology—a fact observed by Buddhists and confirmed by modern science—that a certain form of meditation distances us from our emotions, freeing us from anger, grief, and fear.
To which the right response is: maybe so, but that does not tell us when or why we should want to be free of these emotions, if they do not turn on metaphysical misconceptions of the self. If someone made a drug that would eliminate difficult feelings, we should refuse to take it. I do not believe that Buddhist meditation is, or is meant to be, that drug.
Hi Kieran
I agree with your objection to what you call Wright's second argument (about egoism).
However, this part about his first argument "But this argument makes no sense: if self-interest is a product of natural selection, so is concern for others." seems too quick.
It might be mistaken, but I suspect for empirical, rather than conceptual, reasons. One can think some or many traits are a result of natural selection; others may have evolved but not due to NS. They can be "spin off" or "side effects" of traits that did evolve by natural selection. (example: no one thinks Natural selection evolved a big brain to do calculus - yet - once you've got a big brain, you can do calculus).
So Wright seems to be claiming that our concern for ourselves might have evolved due to NS, but once we have the kind of cognitive and caring systems that have evolved for one reason, we can use them for other reasons (reasons for which they were not favoured by natural selection).
Humans, e.g., also have the ability to kill themselves - but most would think this is a mere "spin off" or side effect of other abilities that have evolved by NS for other reasons. So sometimes we can do things that aren't a result of NS. Imagine rational arguments for suicide in some cases. Apparently humans are capable of doing this (at least sometimes) even if (suppose) natural selection never favoured organisms that kill themselves.
So, in this case, some have suggested that our concern for ourselves (obviously), close family and friends might have been favoured by natural selection on grounds that it benefits the individual. (Don't know exactly what Wright means by "self interest", but this seems a plausible interpretation). Suppose that in relevant ancestral environments, most of those we cared for (including ourselves obvivously) did benefit the individual who cared for them (e.g., due to genetic relatedness or direct reciprocity, perhaps). But then suppose that the agents end up in new environments, where they extend and use these same cognitive systems to care for others, even when those others aren't close relatives.
This is one possible explanation for why we might care about strangers. Perhaps in the relevant ancestral environment NS didn't favour the trait of caring directly for strangers, but such care might be a "side effect" of the reasons it did evolve.
Of course, this is only one possible explanation. But I suspect it is the one Wright has in mind. (He is probably thinking here of the kind of argument that Dawkins and others run).
Another possibility would be that NS favours traits of individuals who do care both about themselves and close family members, but also about those they're not closely related to. This might be favoued by NS via "group selection": Groups of such individuals outcompete other groups that don't have individuals who have concern for strangers.
These are alternative empirical claims, of course. And there are other alternatives. If you're interested in what NS might tell us about whether psychological egoism etc. are true, you might look at Sober and Wilson's book, Unto Others.
But I don't see what is incoherent about Wright's view that a trait could evolve by NS for one reason, and then be used for another. IF he's right (a big "if") that our caring capacities mostly evolved by NS to aim at our self-interest, there is no conceptional problem with us then using those capacities to care for others. (This is also Singer's approach in his old book, The Expanding Circle, which you may know).
At any rate, this is a minor issue for you (though one I happen to be interested in, thus the long comment!). I'm sympathetic with your other objections to the no self view.
And I don't want my objections to this minor point of yours to conceal the fact that I enjoyed this post!
Best,
Chris Stephens
I'm likely to have missed your point on this philosophic Buddhism you say you're not a fan of today.
To begin with ahimsa, or non harm as first principle of Buddhism is where I began to be interested in Buddhism. Ahimsa is the name of my dog trainer's business here in Seattle. This trainer said "I'm here to train you, not your dog. Dog in front of you, dog thinks s/he is protecting you. Dog beside you, dog knows that you are in charge."
If you ever get back to Buddhism, I'd recommend you begin with ahimsa toward yourself first. Life is difficult, and it helps us in a world with no God to practice being kind and loving to each other.
If I started where you did, with No Self, No God, No Other just interbeing, I'd have laughed and discarded the practice field too.
In this world I live in here in Seattle, I've found metta meditation taught by Sharon Salzberg, Pema Chodron, angel Kyoda williams, Jack Kornfield to be especially helpful for regulating my nervous system.
It can just be a wish for you and me, and that is sufficient.
The wish in metta is
may you be safe
may you be happy
may you be healthy
may you be free of fear
may you keep a joyful mind
and I add a slogan from Atisa who taught:
don't expect a standing ovation.
What can be more ethical than not killing? I'd direct you to the work of peace advocate Thich Nhat Hanh, a Vietnamese monk who opposed the Viet Nam war entirely. Guess what? He was not liked by either side.
TNH dedicated his whole life to Buddhist teaching of loving kindness, befriended Martin Luther King Jr., and thanks to the miracle of youtube, will live forever if you are interested in learning more.
If you or your readers here are interested in the idea of no self after you've gotten comfortable regulating your nervous system with metta daily, here is the most succinct teaching of no self that I've found https://youtu.be/2Dn9kqVrKzE
But even if you decide you're right about no self, fake it. Act kindly toward every negative thought that arises from your body today. When you pass a stranger, make eye contact instead of looking at your phone, and smile just for today.
Then you can test out if this practice developing your attention here will benefit you.
The quest for me is to develop a set of spiritual practices for the secular world we live in that supports our hyper social species seeing the individual self is an illusion. We are intimately connected to each other and all the plant and animal cousins here on Earth.
Ahimsa means practicing non harm to yourself, to your friends and family, to people you are indifferent to, and to your difficult people. They could be ex lovers, white wingers in your family, commenters on Substack that bug you. All of it is a practice field for you to learn not to be so triggered by your thoughts.
I still get triggered, but this meditation and way of seeing has helped soften the edges of what I call self.
It seems to me the psychotherapists are right:
1. Life is difficult.
2. We have a hard wired aversion to uncertainty.
3. It takes constant work to keep a joyful mind.
Meditation begins with gentle appreciations and has helped me stay more present with what's shitty in the world is also mindless: racism, sexism, class warfare, greed, feudal power creating wars.
On your first objection, not knowing you for long I can't really say. But I believe the Buddhists talking about No Self are talking about the same thing that physicists are today. As physicist Brian Cox asks "What more do you want?" https://youtube.com/shorts/KSgNly0bSug?feature=share